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１Abstract: System adequacy has been recognized as one of the 
essential properties of a power market; however, there is no 
research work to date specifically on integrating demand-side 
management, demand-side reserve market and supply-side 
reserve market. To ensure system adequacy and improve the 
performance of reserve control, the time-of-use (TOU) power 
price can be employed as a preventive control. Dispatching the 
supply-side reserve, shedding interruptible loads with low and 
high price compensation in the demand-side reserve market 
are considered as emergency or corrective controls after a 
system event. Based on the different technical and economic 
properties of the emergency and preventive controls, this 
paper proposes to quantitatively analyze the performance of 
different control schemes using an integrated system model, 
An optimization algorithm is applied to individual emergency 
controls, preventive controls and the combination of these two 
controls. Simulation results are presented to validate the 
effectiveness of the proposed method. 
Key words: system adequacy, reserve capacity of generation 
side (RCGS); interruptible load (IL); time of use (TOU), 
multi-market coordination optimization 
I. INTRODUCTION 
N a deregulated electricity market, the Independent 
System Operator (ISO) has the overall responsibility for 
proving and procuring various services that are essential for 
the maintenance of system adequacy and security, which are 
the two aspects of power system reliability. In order to fulfill 
the basic objective of a power market, both aspects should 
be maintained carefully. In this paper, both adequacy and 
security are holistically handled in an optimal way based on 
a new approach to handle generation reserve capacity, time 
of use (TOU) power pricing, and interruptible loads.  
Generation reserve capacity and can be measured through 
several parameters including time scale (real-time, daily or 
long-term), responding speed (spinning reserve and 
non-spinning reserve such as ready reserve, and cold start 
reserve), locations, physical property (active or reactive), etc 
[1]. A too low reserve capacity may not be able to satisfy the 
system reliability requirement, never the less, a too high 
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reserve capacity may decrease the economy of the market. 
TOU power pricing is an effective load management scheme 
for curtailing the system peak load during times of resource 
shortage [2]. IL can be employed as emergency reserve 
capacity resource, especially for dealing with capacity fault 
with small probability and high risk. Introducing IL into the 
reserve capacity market is therefore of great importance [3]. 
The existing research of IL broadly falls into two main 
categories. A major research problem of IL services is to 
design appropriate incentive rate structures for customers to 
participant voluntarily in IL programs. It is discussed in [4] 
that, IL services are equivalent to forward contracts bundled 
with a call option. A comprehensive analysis of this kind of 
contracts is presented. A double call option is introduced in 
[5] to account for the effect of early notification of 
curtailment. In [6,7], optimal incentive-rate structures are 
designed for IL contracts using mechanism-design theory. 
Another category of IL research focuses on evaluating the 
influences of IL services on the whole market. In [8], a 
technique is proposed to evaluate how IL services can 
improve the operating benefits of a composite generation 
and transmission system. Sequential Monte Carlo 
simulation is employed in [9] to analyze the effects of IL 
services. In [10], a method is proposed to optimize the 
generation and demand-reduction scheduling.  
In practice, IL contracts have been widely used in the 
reserve markets in a number of countries throughout the 
world. As per North America Electricity Reliability Council 
(NERC) Operating Policy-10 [11], interruptible load 
management (ILM) is recognized as one of the contingency 
reserve services. New York ISO (NYISO), has an 
interruptible load scheme to induce customers to reduce 
their demand during peak [12].In Albert Power Pool in 
Canada, customers can offer IL services to provide for 
additional operation reserve [13]. PJM market also provides 
a load reduction program by which customers may be 
compensated for voluntarily load reduction during 
emergencies [14]. In the electricity market of UK, ILs are 
actively encouraged to compete with generators in the 
provision of all types of reserve services [15].  In 
Australian National Electricity Market, scheduled load, 
which is similar with interruptible load (IL) is recognized 
both as a frequency control ancillary service and a network 
loading control ancillary service [16]. Similarly, Taipower, 
the power utility in Taiwan, employs a program for load 
shedding and relevant compensation when tripping a large 
unit during peak [17].  
The coordination between purchasing reserve capacity of 
generation side (RCGS) and interruptible load (IL) capacity 
according to different time of reserve payments is studied in 
[18]. In [19], the authors propose a coordination model for 
low price interruptible load (ILL) and high compensation 
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interruptible load (ILH). The objective of the coordination 
model is to minimize the total compensation costC , which 
is the sum of the loss of the electricity tariff lC  in the ILL 
market and the compensation risks hC  in the ILH market. 
In this paper, the control of system adequacy is studied 
from the technical aspect. The implementation of 
time-of-use power price (TOU) belongs to the category of 
preventive controls. Dispatching RCGS and interrupting IL 
belong to the category of emergency or corrective controls 
after faults. The direct influence of TOU on normal load 
supply is small, because it requires the consumer to change 
their routine timetable but can be significant if automated 
load control is implemented in domestic premises. The TOU 
and other methods can be mutually complementary because 
some of the technical property of other emergency or 
corrective controls may have different features to the one of 
TOU. 
Furthermore, the optimization of system adequacy 
management is investigated from the economic aspect. It is 
demonstrated that the mutually complementary property 
between the long-term preventive payment with low cost, 
including the cost of TOU, the capacity cost of RCGS, and 
the loss of electricity tariff of ILL, and post-payment with 
high cost, including the energy cost of RCGS and the 
interruption compensation of ILH, makes it possible and 
necessary to coordinate them [20]. 
Based on the research of [19], this paper extends the 
coordination scope to TOU and RCGS. The objective of 
hybrid optimization model of system adequacy management 
is to minimize the sum of risk cost and regular cost of 
control schemes. The optimal peak demand capacity can be 
obtained by minimizing the objective function. 
II. THE DEFINITION OF SYSTEM ADEQUACY CONTROL 
A. Preventive Controls 
Preventive control is implemented before the occurrence 
of system adequacy faults. Since TOU is implemented 
before the fault, it is a preventive control. In this method, the 
load of peak-period is decreased by demand-side economic 
incentives, and therefore the value of system adequacy is 
increased. The peak demand capacity is considered as the 
measure of the level of preventive control. 
B. Emergency or Corrective Controls 
Emergency or corrective controls are implemented after 
the occurrence of capacity faults or a system adequacy 
event. From the technical aspect, RCGS, ILL and ILH can 
be executed either according to a feedforward rule 
(emergency control) or a feedback rule (corrective control). 
No matter which rule is employed; they are all implemented 
after faults. From the economic point of view, the 
dispatching right of RCGS and the interruption right of IL 
capacity must be purchased in advance to ensure enough 
control capacity after faults [8-9]. 
C. Comparison of System Adequacy Control Methods 
The different control methods of system adequacy 
management are compared from economic and physical 
aspects and the results are shown in Table 1. In this 
comparison, TOU is assumed as a form of RCGS consisting 
of instantaneous and delayed reserve. Both TOU and RCGS 
are initiative reserve. ILL and ILH are assumed as 
instantaneous reserve, and are designated as passive reserve. 
The cost of TOU and ILL are certain, while the cost of 
ILH is uncertain. As for RCGS, the capacity cost is certain 
but the energy cost is uncertain. 
 
TABLE 1 CONTROL MEASURES FOR SYSTEM ADEQUACY 
system adequacy control 
means TOU RCGS ILL ILH 
Control 
property 
Preventive 
control Emergency/corrective control 
Control time Before faults After faults 
Influence to 
system 
adequacy 
Improvement 
Influence on
generation 
reduce peak 
demand No direct influence 
Physical 
aspect 
Influence to 
load 
Changing 
time of use 
of power 
No 
interruptions 
or a short-time 
interruption 
Long time interruption
Traded item 
Peak 
capacity 
lowering 
Reserve 
generation 
capacity and 
energy 
Interruption option of 
real-time load 
Relevant 
market Demand side Supply side Demand side 
Settlement 
time sign 
Capacity: 
sign 
Energy: after 
interruption 
sign After interruption 
Economic 
aspect 
Cost 
property certain 
Capacity: 
certain 
Energy: risk 
certain risk 
D. The Mutual Influence between the Preventive Controls 
and the Emergency or Corrective Controls 
Though TOU has no direct influence on the degree of 
severity and probability of capacity faults, it increases real 
available generation capacity by correcting the load demand 
curve. This reduces market power of RCGS and helps 
coordination of RCGS, ILL and ILH.  
III. THE COST OF SYSTEM ADEQUACY CONTROL 
A. The Cost of Preventive Control 
For a transmission company, the cost of applying TOU 
consists of the investment in the system and relevant 
devices, management expense and the loss of electricity fee. 
During zt  period (period of investigation), the regular cost 
of this preventive control can be formulated as, 
zT
T
Ttp tQC QP=)( ,               (1) 
T
LtlttT ppp ],,,[ ,,1, LL=P ,    (2) 
T
LtlttT QQQ ],,,[ ,,1, LL=Q ,   (3) 
max
,,
min
, ltltlt QQQ ≤≤ ，     (4) 
∑=
l
ltt QQ , ,       (5) 
where TP  is the price vector of purchasing peak capacity 
lowering, which consists of L elements corresponding to 
L consumers respectively. TQ is the vector of peak demand 
capacity. ltQ , is the peak demand capacity of consumer 
l . ltp ,  is denoted as the cost of system adequacy control, 
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which is an incremental function of ltQ , and can be 
constant in extreme cases. QT is the total peak capacity 
lowering traded in the transaction in a TOU market. The 
peak capacity lowering of consumer l  may be influenced 
by the rules of the power price, the responsivness model of 
customer, l  including bidding strategies, and total peak 
demand capacity. 
B. The Cost of Emergency or Corrective Controls 
1) PURCHASING GENERATION RESERVE CAPACITY 
AND ENERGY 
The cost of purchasing reserve generation capacity and 
energy can be formulated as 
))()(( ,
,,
,,1 xhxd
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sms QQ ≤, ,                   (12) 
kmk QQ ≤, ,                (13) 
rmr QQ ≤, ,                (14) 
cmc QQ ≤, ,                (15) 
xhxlx QQQ =+ ,, ,               (16) 
where CP  is the vector of capacity price. The subscripts of 
these vectors, including s, k, r, c, denote instantaneous 
reserve, quick reserve, slow reserve, and cold-start reserve 
respectively. Q is the vector of capacity traded in the 
transaction. EP is the vector of electricity prices. ‘A’ is the 
vector of actual cold-start reserve capacity for each 
individual fault m . mq  is the occurrence probability of 
fault m in fault set M . mt  is duration of fault m . tx 
denotes the delay time of the non- instantaneous reserves. 
lC  and dL  are the loss of electricity tariff of ILL and 
compensation cost of ILH respectively. lxQ ,  and hxQ ,  
are interruption capacities during the delay time of ILL and 
ILH. 
The first item in (6) is the cost of purchasing RCGS. The 
second item is the energy cost. The third item is the 
interrupted load during the delay time of the non- 
instantaneous reserves.  
Based on the research in [10], ILL methods are proposed 
as shown in (6). The capacity cost in RCGS is not related to 
the specific occurrence of faults, so it is a fixed cost. The 
energy cost is an uncertain cost since it depends on the 
uncertain faults. The ILL method employs power price 
discount, which is certain compensation before fault; 
however, the customer will not be compensated for the 
interruption when the contracts are implemented. In the ILH 
method, the customer is compensated after interruption, and 
usually the compensation cost exceeds the consumer’s real 
interruption cost.  
2) PURCHASING ILL AND ILH 
The cost of purchasing interruptible capacity of ILL and 
interruptible energy of ILH can be calculated by, [11], 
m
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 (17) 
where certain cost lC  is the loss of electricity tariff, which 
is unrelated to faults. 0p  is the normal price of electricity. 
)( ii Qd  is the average reducing rate of electricity price of 
customer i  in ILL market. )( ii Qd is the incremental 
function of iQ  (
maxmin
iii QQQ ≤≤ ), such as iii Qvu +  
with positive intercept iu  and slope iv , as shown in Fig.1. 
iu  and iv  are bidding strategies of customer i  in ILL 
market and can be constant in extreme cases. The loss of 
electricity fee of the grid company for customer i  is 
iiiii QQdpQC )()( 0=  which is the incremental function 
of iQ . When id  is constant, )( ii QC  is a half radial with 
slope idp0 .  
The compensation cost hC  is uncertain, which depends 
on faults. )( jj Qh  is a high compensation multiple of 
customer j  in ILH market, which is the ratio of unit 
interruption cost to 0p . )( jj Qh  is the incremental 
function of jQ  (
maxmin
jjj QQQ ≤≤ ), such as 
jjj Qβα +  with positive intercept jα  and slope jβ , as 
shown in Fig.2. jα  and jβ  are bidding strategies of 
customer j  in ILL market and can be constant in extreme 
cases. The Compensation expense of company to customer 
j  is jjjjj QQhpQC )()( 0= , which is incremental 
function of jQ . When jh  is constant, )( jj QC  is a half 
radial with slope jhp0 . 
3) THE COST OF EMERGENCY OR CORRECTIVE 
CONTROLS 
The total cost of emergency or corrective controls eC  is 
related to the fault set. eC  reflects the risk level of system 
adequacy in this operating state. It can be expressed as 
21 CCCe +=                      (18) 
This total cost (18) will be used as the objective function 
for the proposed hybrid system adequacy optimization. 
IV. THE HYBRID OPTIMISATION MODEL 
A. Model Formulation 
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TOU method can induce the operating state to a target 
point with high system adequacy by decreasing the 
peak-valley margin of power demand. When the adequacy 
of power system is destroyed by fault m , the emergency or 
corrective controls will be implemented to avoid big 
blackout. Increasing the system adequacy of target point can 
decrease the pressure of emergency or corrective controls. 
Thus preventive controls and emergency or corrective 
controls can be coordinated.  
The objective of coordination model is to minimize the 
coordinative control cost C , which is the sum of the 
regular cost pC  of preventive controls and the uncertain 
cost eC  of emergency or corrective controls. The 
coordination model can be expressed as 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
≥
=
+=
0),,,(
0)(..
),,,,,()()(min 1
hlt
t
Mmtetpt
QQQh
Qgts
QQQQCQCQC
Q
LL
 , (19) 
where 0)( =tQg  is the equality constraint of power flow . 
0≥h  is the inequality constraint of control capacity and 
the requirement of adequacy. lQ (or hQ ) is traded capacity 
in the transaction in ILL market (or ILH market). 
B. The Sub-problem of Emergency or Corrective Controls 
In this section, mQ  is power inadequacy caused by 
fault m . The optimization of emergency or corrective 
controls can be expressed as 
),(min , mtme QQC      (20) 
..ts  0),,( ≥hl QQf Q ,                  (21) 
 mmhmlmcmrmkms QQQQQQQ ≥+++++ ,,,,,, )(  ,(22) 
lml QQ ≤, ,                     (23) 
hmh QQ ≤, ,                   (24) 
where mlQ ,  and mhQ ,  are interruptible capacity of ILL 
and ILH. The constraints of capacity of all kinds of control 
methods are included in (21). Equation (22) is the system 
adequacy constraint. 
C. Solution to the Hybrid Optimisation Problem 
The solution to the optimal problem in this model is 
illustrated in Fig. 1. When tQ  goes up, pC  
monotonically increases. With the increase of tQ , the 
available capacity of RCGS in the market is increased and 
the interruptible capacities of ILL and ILH, which have high 
cost, decrease and consequently, eC  drops monotonically. 
Total cost curve C  has a positive second-order derivative 
with respect to tQ . Therefore, the minimum of C , minC , is 
achieved at otQ . , which is the optimal peak demand 
capacity. Numerical sensitivity analysis is employed here to 
search the point where  0)( =
t
t
dQ
QdC
, which corresponds 
to ),( min. CQ ot . The step length and convergence threshold 
can be selected according to precision requirement. 
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Fig.1 Coordinative optimization of preventive and 
emergency/corrective controls 
 
If the actual available capacity of RCGS and ILL has are 
certain and adequate, the capacity cost will be certain. The 
optimal control scheme under a given fault will only be 
influenced by its energy cost. Therefore, the optimal 
problem can be solved by three steps. The first step is to 
calculate the capacity cost without considering capacity cost 
of RCGS and ILL. By using the demand and supply 
matching curve of ILL market and ILL interruption 
capacity, otQ . , minC , optimal RCGS, mlQ , , and mhQ ,  
can be obtained  for a given fault m . The second step is to 
calculate the maximum of RCGS, mlQ , , and mhQ ,  for all 
faults in the fault set. These maxima will be used as 
configuration capacity for the fault set. The last step is to 
calculate the capacity costs of RCGS and ILL, which is the 
cost of purchasing the capacity before faults. These costs 
will be allocated to relevant costs and total cost. 
V. CASE STUDIES 
A. Simulation Setting 
Part of the Chinese state grid system is taken for case 
studies. In these case studies, 0p  is ¥400RMB/MWh and 
zt is 8h. The total static available generation capacity of the 
studied system is 650 MW. Before implementing TOU, the 
maximal load is 640MW. Each generator submits bids 
according to the linear functional relationship between the 
energy and reserve market. Each customer also submits bids 
according to linear functional relationship between the ILL 
and ILH market as well. Parameters of the customers in 
TOU market are shown in Table 2. Parameters of energy 
market and RCGS market are shown in Table 3 and Table 4 
respectively. Parameters of ILL market and ILH market are 
shown in Table 5 and Table 6. Table 7 is information of the 
fault set.  
TABLE 2  CONSUMER PARAMETERS IN TOU MARKET 
Customer l 1 2 3 4 
Minimal interruptible capacity(MW) 0 0 0 0 
Maximal interruptible capacity(MW) 20 40 40 60 
Price 
ltp ,  (RMB/MWh) 40 80 120 160 
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TABLE 3 PARAMETERS OF ENERGY MARKET  
Generator g 1 2 3 4 
Maximal active output(MW) 90 160 160 240 
Minimal active output(MW) 10 20 20 30 
Bidding strategy ag 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 
Bidding strategy bg 150 160 170 180 
 
TABLE 4 RESPONDING TIME AND BIDDING STRATEGY OF RCGS  
RCGS type s k r c 
Response time(min) 0 10 30 120 
Bidding strategy cg 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 
 
TABLE 5 PARAMETERS OF ILL MARKET 
Customer i 5 6 7 8 
Minimal interruptible 
capacity(MW) 0 0 0 0 
Maximal interruptible 
capacity(MW) 10 20 20 30 
Bidding strategy vi 0.005 0.01 0.012 0.015 
 
TABLE 6 PARAMETERS OF ILH MARKET 
Customer j 9 10 11 12 
Minimal interruptible capacity(MW) 0 0 0 0 
Maximal interruptible capacity(MW) 20 40 40 60 
Bidding strategy βj 1 2 3 4 
 
TABLE 7  FAULT SCENARIOS 
Fault m Probability Total interruptible capacity(MW) 
Persistence time 
(h) 
1 0.050 120 3 
2 0.025 180 5 
3 0.005 240 7 
B. Peak Capacity Lowering Impact on the Trading in 
Energy Market and Available Generation Capacity 
The influence of peak shedding capacity on the available 
generation capacity and market clearing price is shown in 
Figure 2. It can be seen from Fig. 2 that with the increase of 
peak demand capacity, the available generation capacity 
will increase, while the energy market clearing price will 
decrease.  
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Fig.2 The influence of peak shedding capacity on the available 
generation capacity and market clearing price 
C. The Influence of Peak Capacity Lowering on Optimal 
Configuration of Emergency or Corrective Controls 
Fig. 3 shows that the increase of peak capacity lowering 
will increase the dispatching capacity of RCGS and decrease 
the interruption quantity of IL capacity. The total uncertain 
cost of emergency or corrective controls will decrease 
consequently. 
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(a)                                              (b) 
Fig.3 The influence of peak shedding capacity on optimal reserve capacity  
 
D. Risk-Based Coordinative Control and Optimisation 
Decision  
The influence of peak demand capacity on the cost of 
coordinative control is shown in Fig. 4. The lowest point of 
this curve corresponds to the optimal peak capacity lowering 
and its cost. Fig.1 demonstrates the results when considering 
all faults in the fault set. The optimal peak capacity lowering 
is 120 MW and total cost of coordinative control is ¥283.9 × 
1,000RMB. The simulation results of the optimal 
coordinative control are given in Table 8. 
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Fig.4 Optimal peak shedding capacity configuration for each 
individual fault 
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TABLE 8  
RESULTS OF COORDINATIVE OPTIMIZATION  
RCGS ILL capacity ILH capacity 
Fault m Configuration 
capacity before 
fault (MW) 
Real dispatching 
capacity (MW) 
Configuration 
capacity before 
fault(MW) 
Real 
interrupting 
capacity (MW)
Configuration 
capacity before 
fault (MW) 
Real 
interrupting 
capacity 
(MW) 
Peak capacity 
lowering 
(MW) 
Coordi-nativ
e 
Control cost 
(1,000RMB)
1 70 37.85 12.15 60 87.0 
2 100 55.95 24.05 90 128.7 
3 
110 
110 
60.71 
60.71 
69.29 
69.29 100 154.1 
All faults 110 uncertain 60.71 uncertain 69.29 uncertain 120 283.9 
 
VI. COMPARING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PREVENTIVE, 
EMERGENCY OR CORRECTIVE AND COORDINATION 
CONTROLS 
The Effectiveness of different control schemes are 
compared with the same model, parameters and fault 
scenarios. Table 9 shows the control schemes, including 
implementing TOU individually that corresponds to curve 1 
in Fig. 5, dispatching RCGS individually that corresponds to 
curve 2 in Fig. 5, interrupting IL individually that 
corresponds to curve 3 in Fig. 5, and all possible 
combination. In Fig.5, we can see that the more of the 
coordinative control methods are employed, the greater the 
economic benefit that will be achieved. Curve 7 in Fig.5 
shows the optimal case by employing all control methods. 
TABLE 9    
VARIOUS TYPES OF CONTROL SCHEMES FOR SYSTEM ADEQUACY 
Preventive 
control 
Emergency/corrective 
controls 
Control scheme 
Implementing 
TOU 
Dispatching 
RCGS 
Interrupting 
ILL and 
ILH 
capacity 
Scheme 1 √   
Scheme 2  √  
Scheme 3   √ 
Scheme 4  √ √ 
Scheme 5 √ √  
Scheme 6 √  √ 
Scheme 7 √ √ √ 
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1~7：Index number of the control scheme 
 Fig.5 Costs of various control schemes for system adequacy 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, an optimal preventive and emergency 
control method of load management is proposed.. TOU is 
employed as preventive control. Dispatching of RCGA, 
interrupting demand-side capacity (ILL/ILH) are applied as 
emergency or corrective controls after faults. The uncertain 
cost of emergency or corrective controls can reflect the risk 
level of system adequacy. The economic benefit can be 
greatly enhanced by fully utilizing mutually complementary 
properties in technical and economic aspects between 
preventive controls and emergency or corrective controls, 
and applying risk management and coordinative 
optimization. The proposed method has some limitations to 
be applied in a mature electricity market, because TOU is 
usually exercised by retail companies, rather than ISO, in 
this kind of markets. The retailer can incorporate 
transmission requirements in the consumer contract for a 
suitable price. The proposed method, however, can be very 
effective in the electricity market of China, given its special 
characteristics. 
The problem of hybrid optimization of system adequacy 
is an optimal coordinative control problem. The objective 
function of the proposed model is the sum of the costs of 
preventive controls and emergency or corrective controls 
with the constraint of system adequacy requirement. The 
proposed method can not only well coordinate ILL, ILH and 
RCGS markets, but also can guarantee the system adequacy 
and economic benefit. Simulation results are presented to 
validate the proposed method. 
VIII. REFERENCES 
[1] XUE Yusheng. “Space-time cooperative framework for 
defending blackouts: part 3 optimization and cooperation of 
defense-lines”, Automation of Electric Power Systems, 2006, 
30(3): 1-10. 
[2] Sheen, J.-N.; Chen, C.-S.; Wang, T.-Y.: “Response of large 
industrial customers to electricity pricing by voluntary 
time-of-use in Taiwan”, IEE Proc. Generation, Transmission 
and Distribution, Vol. 142, No. 2, March 1995 pp.157 – 166. 
[3] XUE Yusheng, “Interactions between power market stability 
and power system stability”, Automation of Electric Power 
Systems, 2002, 26(21): 1-6. 
[4] Gedra, T.W., and Varaiya, P.P.: “Markets and pricing for 
interruptible electric power”, IEEE Trans., 1993, PWRS-8, 
(1), pp. 122–128. 
[5] Oren, S.S.: “Integrating real and financial options in 
demand-side electricity contracts”, Decis. Support Syst., 
2001, 30, (3), pp. 279–288. 
[6] Fahrioglu, M., and Alvarado, F.L.: “Designing incentive 
compatible contracts for effective demand management”, 
IEEE Trans., 2000, PWRS-15, (4), pp. 1255–1260. 
[7] Fahrioglu, M., and Alvarado, F.L.: “Using utility 
information to calibrate customer demand management 
behavior models”, IEEE Trans., 2001, PWRS-16, (2), pp. 
C
on
tro
l c
os
t /
 th
ou
sa
nd
 Y
ua
n 
30
250
20
150
10
50
 - 7 - 
317–322. 
[8] Fotuhi-Firuzabad,M., and Billinton, R.: “Impact of load 
management on composite system reliability evaluation 
short-term operating benefits”, IEEE Trans., 2000, 
PWRS-15, (2), pp. 858–864.  
[9] Chen, H., and Billinton, R.: “Interruptible load analysis 
using sequential Monte Carlo simulation”, IEE Proc.-Gener. 
Transm,.Distrib., 2001, 148, (6), pp. 535–539.  
[10] Strbac, G., Farmer, E.D., and Cory, B.J.: “Framework for 
the incorporation of demand-side in a competitive electricity 
market”, IEE Proc.-Gener. Transm. Distrib., 1996, 143, (3), pp. 
232–237.  
[11] NERC Operating Policy-IO on Interconnected Operations 
Services, Draft-3.1, February 2000. 
[12] Treatment of Distributed Resources: The Accommodation of 
Price Sensitive Load, Interruptible Load, Dispatchable Load, 
Distributed Generation and Intermittent Generation in the 
New York Electricity Market: NYISO-DSM Focus Group, 
1998. 
[13] (1998) Voluntary Load Curtailment Program. Power Pool of 
Alberta.[Online]. Available: http://www.powerpool.ab.ca 
[14] [Online]. Available: http://www.pjm.com. 
[15] [Online]. Available: 
http://www.nationalgridinfo.co.uk/balancing/mn_commerci
al.html. 
[16] National Electricity Market Management Company 
(NEMMCO), Australia, “Guide to Ancillary Services in 
National Electricity Market,” Version 1.0, August 2001. 
[17] C. S. Chen and J. T. Leu, “Interruptible load control for 
Taiwan power company,” IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 5, 
pp. 460–465, May 1990. 
[18] LAI Yening, XUE Yusheng, WANG Dexing, et al. “Risk 
decision-marking for reserve capacity market”, Automation 
of Electric Power Systems, 2006, 30(16): 1-5. 
[19] LUO Yunhu, XUE Yusheng, LIU Huawei, et al. 
“Coordination of low price interruptible load and high 
compensation interruptible load”, Automation of Electric 
Power Systems, 2006, 31. 
[20] XUE Yusheng, “Coordinations of preventive control and 
emergency control for transient stability”, Automation of 
Electric Power Systems, 2002, 26(4): 1-4, 9. 
                  
Luo Yunhu (1975－) is pursuing his Ph.D. degree at South East University 
and his major research interest is demand side management. E-mail：
jn_lyh2006@126.com 
Xue Yusheng (1941－) is member of Chinese Academy of Engineering, 
Chief Engineer of Nanjing Automation Research Institute, and Guest 
Professor of seven Chinese Universities. His major research interest is the 
automation of Power System. E-mail: yxue@nari-china.com 
Xia Yin (1976 −) is pursuing her PhD at the University of Queensland, 
Australia. Her research interest is electricity market risk management and 
optimal bidding strategies. E-mail: yinxia@itee.uq.edu.au. 
ZhaoYang Dong (1971−), PhD, Associate Professor, University of 
Queensland, Australia. His research interests include power system 
stability and control, evolutionary computation and power market analysis. 
E-mail：zdong@itee.uq.edu.au. 
Gerard Ledwich (1951 – ) is Chair in Power Engineering at Queensland 
University of Technology with interests in power system operation, 
dynamics, distributed generation and asset management  Email 
g.ledwich@qut.edu.au.   
 
